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U.S. INTERPOL:
THE FAR-REACHING CONSEQUENCES OF
UNITED STATES V. PENDLETON
Carmelo Tringali*
In the void of Foreign Commerce Clause jurisprudence, appellate
courts have advanced several problematic approaches for establishing
the boundaries of Congress’s constitutional power. Fortunately, the
Third Circuit took a step in the right direction in United States v.
Pendleton by adopting the Interstate Commerce Clause framework that
the Supreme Court established in United States v. Lopez.
Unfortunately, however, the Third Circuit adjudicated Pendleton under
Lopez’s “Channels of Commerce” prong and found 18 U.S.C.
§ 2423(c) to be a constitutional exercise of Congress’s foreign
commerce authority. This holding is important because such deference
to Congress’s foreign commerce power can encroach upon foreign
nations’ sovereignty and transform the U.S. Government into a global
police force, inconsistent with the limitations of the Constitution. This
Comment examines the Third Circuit’s ruling in Pendleton, argues that
the Third Circuit incorrectly applied Lopez to that case, and contends
that a correct application would have demonstrated that § 2423(c) is
unconstitutional.

* J.D. Candidate, May 2013, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; A.B., June 2008, Harvard
University. I would like to sincerely thank Karl Manheim for challenging me to write on this
topic, Christopher May and Daniel Siegel for their guidance and legal judgment, and Timothy
Heafner for his editorial judgment. Even more appreciation is due to my loving and supportive
parents, Salvatore and Genelle Tringali, who have made my education possible.
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“There is something deeply unsettling about the idea that
Congress’s power to regulate American citizens abroad is
constrained only by whether or not they open their wallets.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a troubling development in the caselaw interpreting
Congress’s authority to police U.S. citizens’ conduct abroad under
the Foreign Commerce Clause.2 For instance, 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c),
which prohibits any American citizen or permanent resident traveling
in foreign commerce from “engaging in any illicit sexual conduct
with another person,”3 has prompted several constitutional
challenges. In the void of Foreign Commerce Clause jurisprudence,4
appellate courts have advanced several problematic approaches for
establishing the boundaries of Congress’s power. The Ninth Circuit
was the first appellate court to address the issue.5 In United States v.
Clark,6 the court determined that the Interstate Commerce Clause
framework developed in United States v. Lopez7 does not apply in
the foreign commerce context.8 The court instead developed a
“global, commonsense approach”9 that focuses on “whether [a]
statute bears a rational relationship to Congress’s authority under the
Foreign Commerce Clause.”10 Applying this approach, the court
found § 2423(c) to be a constitutional exercise of Congress’s foreign
commerce power.11

1. Recent Case, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2612, 2616 (2006).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3 (“Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States . . . .”).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) (2006).
4. See United States v. Pendleton, 658 F.3d 299, 307 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct.
2771 (2012); Anthony J. Colangelo, The Foreign Commerce Clause, 96 VA. L. REV. 949, 951–52
(2010).
5. See United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2006).
6. 435 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2006).
7. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). The Lopez Court identified three broad categories of activity that
Congress may regulate under its commerce power: [1] “the use of the channels of interstate
commerce,” [2] “the instrumentalities of interstate commerce,” and [3] “those activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce.” Id. at 558–59.
8. Clark, 435 F.3d at 1102–03.
9. Id. at 1103.
10. Id. at 1114.
11. Id. at 1116–17.
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The Third Circuit came to the same conclusion in United States
v. Pendleton12 despite rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s global,
commonsense approach in favor of the established Lopez
framework.13 Of the three categories of commercial activities that
Lopez allows Congress to regulate,14 the Third Circuit grounded its
opinion on the first—Congress’s ability to regulate the channels of
interstate commerce.15
It is problematic that multiple approaches have developed for
determining the constitutionality of congressional exercises of
Congress’s foreign commerce power, and it is further troubling that
these approaches have affirmed the constitutionality of § 2423(c).
Such deferential interpretations of statutes like § 2423(c) not only
encroach upon the sovereignty of foreign nations16 but also
effectively transform the U.S. Government into INTERPOL by
recognizing in Congress a “plenary [global] police power”17 that is
inconsistent with the limitations of the Constitution.18 Allowing
Congress to legislate on any matter so long as the statute contains a
jurisdictional component linking the regulated behavior to foreign
commerce establishes a dangerous precedent that Congress could
abuse to exercise plenary police power not only internationally but
also domestically.19
This Comment argues that the Pendleton court incorrectly
applied Lopez’s “channels of commerce” prong and that the court
should have instead evaluated the case under Lopez’s “substantially
affects commerce” prong. The facts of Pendleton are briefly set forth
in Part II, and the court’s reasoning is analyzed in Part III. Part IV
12. 658 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 2771 (2012).
13. Id. at 308.
14. See supra note 7.
15. See Pendleton, 658 F.3d at 308.
16. Colangelo, supra note 4, at 1002; Recent Case, supra note 1, at 2619.
17. Colangelo, supra note 4, at 1000 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995)).
18. See id. at 1002–03, 1034; Recent Case, supra note 1, at 2615; cf. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566
(“The Constitution . . . withhold[s] from Congress a plenary police power.”).
19. E.g., United States v. Shenandoah, 595 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v.
Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. May, 535 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2008); see
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615–16 (2000); Bailey Bifoss, Comment, The Sex
Offender Registration and Notification Act: The Need to Break the Constitutional Mold, 41
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 255, 280–83 (2011); Colangelo, supra note 4, at 996, 1000; Recent
Case, supra note 1, at 2615–16.
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then (1) demonstrates how the Third Circuit misapplied the Lopez
framework in its review of the constitutionality of § 2423(c), and
(2) explains why a correct application of the “substantially affects
commerce” prong of Lopez would have found § 2423(c) to be
unconstitutional. Part V concludes by summarizing the Third
Circuit’s errors in Pendleton and encouraging the Supreme Court to
grant certiorari to the next case that is appealed involving a
conviction under § 2423(c) and, at the very least, to declare that
Lopez applies in the foreign commerce context and that § 2423(c)
should be evaluated under Lopez’s “substantially affects commerce”
prong.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On November 25, 2005, Thomas Pendleton flew from New
York City to Hamburg, Germany.20 While still in Germany six
months later, Pendleton sexually molested a fifteen-year-old boy.21
German authorities arrested Pendleton, who was later convicted of
“engaging in sexual acts with a person incapable of resistance” and
imprisoned for nineteen months in Germany.22 After serving his
sentence, Pendleton returned to the United States, where he was
arrested and indicted by a federal grand jury for engaging in illicit
sexual conduct in Germany in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c).23
Pendleton moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that
§ 2423(c) was beyond Congress’s authority under the Foreign
Commerce Clause.24 The district court, however, denied the motion
and upheld § 2423(c), determining that the statute was a regulation of
the channels of foreign commerce and was thus a valid exercise of
Congress’s foreign commerce power.25 Pendleton was then convicted
for violating § 2423(c) and sentenced to thirty years in prison.26
Pendleton appealed the district court’s judgment, again raised a facial
challenge to the constitutionality of § 2423(c).27
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Pendleton, 658 F.3d at 301.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 302.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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III. THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S REASONING
One of the main issues on appeal was whether Congress had the
authority under the Foreign Commerce Clause to enact 18 U.S.C.
§ 2423(c).28 The Third Circuit began by briefly outlining the
evolution of Commerce Clause jurisprudence and summarizing the
current three-part test established in United States v. Lopez for
evaluating congressional exercises of this power.29 The court
explained that, under Lopez, Congress has the power to regulate
“(1) the use of the channels of interstate commerce; (2) the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce; and (3) activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce.”30
The court then outlined the sparse history of Foreign Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, noting that the Supreme Court has yet to
determine whether the Lopez framework applies in the foreign
commerce context.31 After introducing and considering adoption of
the Ninth Circuit’s “global, commonsense approach” to adjudicating
Foreign Commerce Clause issues, the Third Circuit decided to apply
the Lopez test, as though § 2423(c) were directed at interstate
commerce.32 The court explained that applying the narrower Lopez
standard would allow it to sufficiently resolve the case without
having to address whether the Supreme Court would ultimately adopt
the Ninth Circuit’s global, commonsense test.33
After deciding on its standard of review, the Third Circuit
concluded that § 2423(c) is constitutional under Lopez.34 The court
based this determination on the principle that Congress has broad
authority to regulate the channels of commerce and need not include
an element of mens rea in doing so.35 Regarding this authority to
regulate, the court declared that the Supreme Court has long
sustained Congress’s ability to “keep the channels of interstate

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 301.
Id. at 305–06.
Id. at 306 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558−59 (1995)).
Id. at 306–08.
See id. at 307−08.
Id. at 308.
Id.
Id. at 308–09.

396

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:391

commerce free from immoral and injurious uses.”36 This authority,
moreover, “is not confined to regulations with an economic purpose
or impact.”37 The court supported this statement with explanatory
parenthetical citations38 to Caminetti v. United States,39 Perez v.
United States,40 and United States v. Cummings.41 In each of these
cases, the defendants utilized the channels of commerce to transport
a person illegally.42
The court next addressed Pendleton’s attempt to distinguish
§ 2423(c) from 18 U.S.C. § 2423 (b), which criminalizes “travel[ing]
in foreign commerce[] for the purpose of engaging in . . . illicit
sexual conduct.”43 Pendleton noted that unlike § 2423(b), § 2423(c)
does not contain a mens rea element linking the regulated activity to
the use of channels of foreign commerce.44 Pendleton further
explained that as a result, § 2423(c) applies even to those who use
the channels of foreign commerce for lawful purposes but later
engage in illicit sexual conduct after they have ceased using the
channels.45 Pendleton asserted that because of this consequence,
§ 2423(c), like the statute at issue in United States v. Rodia,46 did not
fall within Congress’s foreign commerce power under Lopez’s
“channels of commerce” prong.47
The Third Circuit, however, fixed itself on the fact that
§ 2423(c) effectively applies to those who employ the channels of
commerce for legal purposes, and it spent the remainder of its
opinion addressing this point.48 The court began by stating that,
“[c]ontrary to Pendleton’s assertions, . . . a statute need not include
an element of mens rea to trigger the [channels of commerce] prong

36. Id. at 308 (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256
(1964)) (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612 (2000)).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 308–09.
39. 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
40. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
41. 281 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2002).
42. See id.
43. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (2006).
44. See Pendleton, 658 F.3d at 309.
45. Id.
46. 194 F.3d 465, 473 (3d Cir. 1999).
47. Pendleton, 658 F.3d at 309.
48. See id. at 309−11.
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of Lopez.”49 It noted that in United States v. Shenandoah50 it had
upheld certain portions of the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act (SORNA),51 which, like § 2423(c), “does not
require that a sex offender intend, at the time of travel, to later
violate federal registration requirements.”52 The court stressed that
Congress specifically enacted SORNA to address the significant
problem of sex offenders “go[ing] missing” from the national
registry by moving from one state to another.53 The court concluded
that because Congress has the authority to regulate “the use of
interstate commerce to facilitate forms of immorality,” it was “not
obliged to include an express intent or temporal element in
[SORNA].”54
As with SORNA, Congress could, according to the Third
Circuit, “regulate persons who use the channels of commerce to
circumvent local laws that criminalize child abuse . . . .”55 Like it did
with sex offenders going missing from the national registries,
Congress found sexual abuse of foreign children to be a serious
problem.56 The court further stated that § 2423(c) was, like SORNA,
“enacted to close the enforcement gap and to ‘send a message to
those who go to foreign countries to exploit children.’”57 Thus, the
court determined that “just as Congress may cast a wide net to stop
sex offenders from traveling in interstate commerce to evade state
registration requirements, so too may it attempt to prevent sex
tourists from using the channels of foreign commerce to abuse
children.”58
The court concluded by reaffirming that § 2423(c) was a valid
exercise of power under the Foreign Commerce Clause since the

49. Id. at 309.
50. 595 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 2010).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2006).
52. Pendleton, 658 F.3d at 309.
53. Id. at 310 (internal quotation marks omitted).
54. Id. (quoting United States v. Shenandoah, 595 F.3d 151, 161 (3d Cir. 2010)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
55. Id. at 311.
56. See id. at 310–11.
57. Id. at 311 (quoting 148 CONG. REC. H3884 (daily ed. June 25, 2002) (statement of Rep.
Lamar Smith)).
58. Id.
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statute’s “jurisdictional element” has an “express connection” to the
channels of foreign commerce.59
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE
THIRD CIRCUIT’S REASONING
The Third Circuit misapplied the Lopez framework in its
analysis of § 2423(c)’s constitutionality and should have applied the
“substantially affects interstate commerce” prong of Lopez—the
appropriate standard for Pendleton’s case. Analyzing United States v.
Pendleton under this latter prong would have shown § 2423(c) to be
an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s authority under the
Foreign Commerce Clause.
A. The Third Circuit Misapplied Lopez
Although the Third Circuit was correct in stating that Congress’s
authority to regulate the channels of commerce “is not confined to
regulations with an economic purpose or impact,”60 it was incorrect
in determining that § 2423(c)’s jurisdictional element has an
“express connection” to the channels of foreign commerce.61 The
court attempted to establish this express connection by citing three
purportedly analogous cases: Caminetti v. United States, Perez v.
United States, and United States v. Cummings.62 All three cases,
however, are distinguishable from Pendleton.
Unlike in Pendleton, the particular statutes at issue in those three
cases outlawed actions committed while in or using a channel of
commerce.63 Cummings, for instance, personally removed both his
children from the United States by taking them to Germany on a
commercial airline.64 In doing so, he violated 18 U.S.C. § 1204(a),65

59. Id.
60. Id. at 308.
61. Id. at 311.
62. Id. at 308–09.
63. Cf. United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1119–20 (9th Cir. 2006) (Ferguson, J.,
dissenting) (distinguishing Cummings’s illegal transportation of his children via the channels of
foreign commerce from Clark’s molestation of multiple boys in Cambodia after traveling through
foreign commerce from the United States).
64. United States v. Cummings, 281 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 2002).
65. Section 1204(a) makes it a crime to “remove[] a child from the United States, or
attempt[] to do so, or retain[] a child (who has been in the United States) outside the United States
with intent to obstruct the lawful exercise of parental rights.” 18 U.S.C. § 1204(a) (2006).
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since he did not have permanent custody of either child.66 In
Caminetti, the defendants similarly violated the Mann Act of 191067
by personally transporting their mistresses by commercial railway
from California to Nevada.68 Unlike the courts in Caminetti and
Cummings, the Perez Court applied Lopez’s “substantially affects
interstate commerce” prong.69 Nonetheless, in outlining Congress’s
commerce powers, the Court identified 18 U.S.C. § 1201 as a valid
exercise of Congress’s ability to regulate the use of the channels of
commerce.70 But like the statutes at issue in Caminetti and
Cummings, § 1201 applies only when a “[kidnapped] person is
willfully transported in interstate or foreign commerce.”71
Unlike the Mann Act and 18 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a) and 1204(a),
18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) requires only that the person committing the
illicit sexual conduct have traveled in foreign commerce. Thus,
§ 2423(c) covers behavior that one engages in long after having used
the channels of commerce.72 Indeed, Pendleton sexually molested his
victim six months after his commercial flight from New York landed
in Germany.73
Nor is the illicit sexual conduct that 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c)
prohibits connected to the use of the channels of foreign commerce
by a mens rea requirement, as is the case in the Mann Act and
18 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a) and 1204(a).74 The Mann Act and §§ 1201(a)
and 1204(a) link their respective regulations of behavior to the
channels of commerce by requiring that one purposefully—or at least
66. See Cummings, 281 F.3d at 1047–48.
67. As characterized by the Caminetti court, The Mann Act
specifically made [it] an offense to knowingly transport or cause to be transported, etc.,
in interstate commerce, any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or
debauchery, or for ‘any other immoral purpose,’ or with the intent and purpose to
induce any such woman or girl to become a prostitute or to give herself up to
debauchery, or to engage in any other immoral practice.
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).
68. Id. at 482–83.
69. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154–57 (1971).
70. Id. at 150.
71. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (2006).
72. See United States v. Pendleton, 658 F.3d 299, 301–02, 309–11 (3d Cir. 2011) cert.
denied 132 S. Ct. 2771 (2012); United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1119–20 (9th Cir. 2006)
(Ferguson, J., dissenting); Colangelo, supra note 4, at 997–99; Recent Case, supra note 1, at
2615–16.
73. Pendleton, 658 F.3d at 301.
74. See Clark, 435 F.3d at 1119.
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willfully—use the channels of commerce to commit the particular
proscribed act.75 Section 2423(c), on the other hand, is entirely
devoid of any intent requirement that would link the regulated
behavior to using the channels of foreign commerce. The statute
simply proscribes engaging in illicit sexual conduct after traveling in
foreign commerce.76 This chasm between § 2423(c)’s proscription
against illicit sexual conduct and a connection to travel in foreign
commerce is made even clearer by reading § 2423(c)’s sister statute,
18 U.S.C. § 2423(b). Section 2423(b) explicitly criminalizes travel in
foreign commerce “for the purpose of engaging in any illicit sexual
conduct.”77 Indeed, the Third Circuit expressly recognized this
difference in Pendleton when it explained that Congress omitted an
intent requirement in drafting § 2423(c) in order to make prosecuting
sex tourists easier than it was under § 2423(b).78
Recognizing, however, that § 2423(c) contains no mens rea
requirement linking illegal sexual conduct to travel in foreign
commerce, the Third Circuit attempted to justify its “express
connection” analysis with a comparison to SORNA.79 Like
§ 2423(c), SORNA’s 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) does not require that a sex
offender intend at the time of travel to later violate federal
registration requirements.80 Nonetheless, in the very next paragraph,
the Third Circuit stated that Congress was within its constitutional
authority in enacting SORNA specifically because it did so to
regulate those who use interstate commerce with the purpose of
“facilitat[ing] forms of immorality.”81 And this is no subtle mistake
by the court. Toward the end of its holding, the Third Circuit again
75. See supra notes 65, 67, 71 and accompanying text; cf. United States v. Tykarsky, 446
F.3d 458, 471 (3d Cir. 2006) (“By requiring that the interstate travel be ‘for the purpose of’
engaging in illicit sexual activity, Congress has narrowed the scope of the law to exclude mere
preparation, thought or fantasy; the statute only applies when the travel is a necessary step in the
commission of a crime.”); Colangelo, supra note 4, at 993 (explaining that courts have upheld
laws regulating intended illegal use of the channels of interstate commerce so long as “the
government can ‘prove that the crossing [of state lines] was made with the intent to engage in the
proscribed conduct’” (quoting United States v. Gamache, 156 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1998))).
76. Clark, 435 F.3d at 1119−20.
77. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (2006) (emphasis added).
78. Pendleton, 658 F.3d at 311.
79. See id. at 309–10.
80. 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2006); Pendleton, 658 F.3d at 309.
81. Pendleton, 658 F.3d at 310 (quoting United States v. Shenandoah, 595 F.3d 151, 161 (3d
Cir. 2010)).
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affirmed that Congress enacted SORNA “to stop sex offenders from
traveling in interstate commerce to evade state registration
requirements.”82
In interpreting the congressional intent behind SORNA, the
court either misread the relevant provision of SORNA or read into it
a requirement that is not apparent on the face of the statute. If the
SORNA’s purpose is indeed to regulate those who use the channels
of commerce in order to evade state registration requirements, then,
contrary to the Third Circuit’s original assertion, SORNA does
contain a mens rea requirement that links failing to register with
traveling in foreign commerce. Accordingly, in any case involving
an individual accused of violating SORNA, the prosecution must
establish this mens rea requirement83—namely, that the defendant
intended to use the channels of commerce to thwart state registration
requirements.
The Third Circuit continued its comparison to SORNA by
thoroughly analyzing the specific ways in which § 2423(c) is similar
to it.84 At three separate points, the court stated that the purpose of
§ 2423(c), like SORNA, is to prevent individuals from using the
channels of commerce to commit, or to facilitate committing, a
crime.85 The court first stated that “[§] 2423(c) was enacted to . . .
‘send a message to those who go to foreign countries to exploit
children.’”86 The court then explained that, “as it did with SORNA,
Congress enacted § 2423(c) to regulate persons who use the channels
of commerce to circumvent local laws that criminalize child
abuse.”87 Finally, in case the court was not clear in explaining that
§ 2423(c) is in fact aimed at deterring those who intend to use the
channels of commerce to engage in illicit sexual conduct, it again
compared § 2423(c) to SORNA: “[J]ust as Congress may cast a wide
net to stop sex offenders from traveling in interstate commerce to
82. Id. at 311 (emphasis added).
83. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“Lest there remain any doubt about the
constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”).
84. Pendleton, 658 F.3d at 311.
85. Id.
86. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 148 CONG. REC. H3884 (daily ed. June 25, 2002)
(statement of Rep. Lamar Smith)).
87. Id. (emphasis added).
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evade state registration requirements, so too may it attempt to
prevent sex tourists from using the channels of foreign commerce to
abuse children.”88
By asserting that Congress enacted § 2423(c) to regulate those
who use the channels of foreign commerce for the purpose of
engaging in illicit sex acts, the court similarly either misread
§ 2423(c) or read into it a requirement that is not apparent on the face
of the statute. As it was with the Pendleton court’s reading of
SORNA, if the purpose of § 2423(c) is indeed to regulate those who
use the channels of foreign commerce for the purpose of engaging in
illicit sex acts, then, again contrary to the Third Circuit’s original
assertion, § 2423(c) does in fact contain a mens rea requirement
linking the illicit sexual conduct to travel in foreign commerce.
Such an interpretation of § 2423(c) would sufficiently link the
behavior that the statute regulates to the use of the channels of
foreign commerce, and Congress thus would have been within its
foreign commerce powers in enacting § 2423(c).89 According to this,
however, the prosecution would be required to establish a mens rea
requirement in any case in which an individual is accused of
violating § 2432(c).90 Hence, the Government should have proven in
the district court that Pendleton intended to use the channels of
foreign commerce to engage in illicit sex acts.
The Government, however, never proved this element.91
According to the district court, Pendleton was being charged with
“engag[ing] in illicit sexual conduct while traveling in foreign
commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c).”92 Neither of the
district court’s opinions mentioned whether Pendleton intended to
use the channels of foreign commerce to engage in the illicit sex
act.93 Nor did the Third Circuit address whether the United States
sufficiently proved that Pendleton used the channels of foreign
commerce to engage in illicit sexual conduct. The Third Circuit
88. Id. (emphasis added).
89. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611–12 (2000); Pendleton, 658 F.3d at
308.
90. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
91. See United States v. Pendleton, 2010 WL 427230, at *5 (D. Del. Feb. 2, 2010), aff’d, 658
F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2011).
92. Id.
93. See id.
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never even reviewed the district court’s finding that Pendleton was
guilty of violating § 2423(c).94 Accordingly, if § 2423(c) includes the
mens rea requirement that the Third Circuit read into it,95 then the
district court erred in convicting Pendleton under § 2423(c) and the
Third Circuit erred in upholding that conviction, since neither court
determined whether Pendleton possessed the requisite intent.96
If, however, the Third Circuit did not read a mens rea
requirement into § 2423(c), then it instead misread the statute (and
possibly also SORNA). This conclusion is more likely since such a
reading of § 2432(c) would equate it to § 2423(b), thus rendering
subsection (c) superfluous. This potential misreading of § 2423(c)
has one of two effects on the court’s analysis. First, if the court were
correct in reading SORNA to possess a mens rea element, then the
court’s comparison of § 2423(c) to SORNA was inapposite. Second,
if the court misread both SORNA and § 2423(c), then it completely
failed to establish that the “channels of interstate commerce”
component of the Commerce Clause permits Congress to regulate
activity that is not explicitly connected to a channel of commerce.
Whatever its specific effect on the court’s rationale, the
consequence of this misreading are the same: the Third Circuit
provided no valid justification for why § 2423(c) is a constitutional
exercise of Congress’s foreign commerce authority under the “use of
the channels of commerce” prong of Lopez. The three cases that the
court cited—Caminetti, Perez, and Cummings—to support the
“express connection” between regulating illicit sexual conduct and
the channels of foreign commerce are distinguishable from
Pendleton. The court additionally either failed to make the United
States prove the mens rea requirement it read into § 2423(c) or,
alternatively, failed to cite a relevant case involving a constitutional
exercise of commerce power in which the regulated activity was not
explicitly connected to the channel of commerce. Therefore, the
Third Circuit’s application of the “channels of commerce” prong of
Lopez to Pendleton was inapposite and incorrect.

94. See United States v. Pendleton, 658 F.3d 299, 302 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct.
2771 (2012).
95. See supra text accompanying notes 84−90.
96. See supra text accompanying note 94.
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B. The Third Circuit Should Have Applied
the “Substantially Affects” Prong of Lopez
In addition to the use of the channels of interstate commerce, the
Supreme Court has recognized two supplementary categories that
Congress may regulate: (1) “the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, . . . persons or things in interstate commerce,” and
(2) “those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.”97
These commerce powers are independent of one another; if Congress
lacks the authority to regulate certain conduct under one prong of
Lopez, it may nonetheless possess authority to regulate the same
activity under the other two prongs.98 Accordingly, because the Third
Circuit has found that Lopez applies in the foreign commerce
context,99 and because the Pendleton court should have found that
Congress does not have the authority to regulate an individual’s
sexual conduct abroad under Lopez’s “channels of foreign
commerce” prong, the court should have analyzed whether engaging
in illicit sexual conduct substantially affects foreign commerce.100
“Several significant considerations contribute[] to deci[ding]”101
whether an activity substantially affects interstate—or, in this case,
foreign—commerce.102 The first and “central” factor that courts
consider is whether the regulated activity is “economic” in nature.103
97. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995).
98. See United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465, 473–74 & n.3 (3d Cir. 1999) (turning “to
the . . . matter[] [of] whether Congress had a rational basis for believing that the intrastate
possession of [child] pornography has a substantial effect on interstate commerce” after finding
that Congress did not have the authority to regulate intrastate possession of child pornography
under the “use of the channels of commerce” or “instrumentalities of commerce” prongs of
Lopez).
99. See Pendleton, 658 F.3d at 306–08.
100. This Comment declines to discuss whether § 2423(c) is a constitutional exercise of
Congress’s foreign commerce powers under the “instrumentalities” prong of Lopez because, as
the Third Circuit found in Rodia, its definition of “instrumentalities” precludes Congress from
relying on this commerce power to validate § 2423(c). See Rodia, 194 F.3d at 473–74 & n.3
(quoting United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 588 (3d Cir. 1995)) (confining “instrumentalities”
to anything “used as a means of transporting goods and people across state lines” and concluding
that this prong of Lopez did not apply to a statute that criminalized the possession of child
pornography that had not itself traveled in interstate commerce, even though the materials from
which it was created had so traveled). In this case, just as the link between engaging in illicit
sexual conduct and foreign commerce is too attenuated to allow invocation of the channels
rationale, it is too indirect to qualify under the “instrumentalities of commerce” prong of Lopez.
101. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000).
102. See id.
103. Id. at 610.
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The second factor, which is also “important,” is whether the statute
contains an “express jurisdictional element which might limit its
reach to a discrete set of [the regulated activity] that additionally
have [sic] an explicit connection with or effect on interstate
commerce.”104 Third, courts are to consider how attenuated the
connection is between the regulated activity and interstate
commerce.105 The final factor is whether “legislative history
contain[s] express congressional findings regarding the [regulated
activity’s] effects upon interstate commerce . . . .”106 These last two
considerations, however, are not as important as the first two,107 and
the second factor is not itself dispositive.108
Had the Third Circuit applied the “substantially affects
commerce” factors in Pendleton, it would have likely found that
“engag[ing] in any illicit sexual conduct with another person”109 does
not substantially affect foreign commerce. In United States v.
Morrison, the Supreme Court struck down a statute that provided a
federal civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence.110
First, the Court found that “[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence
are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity.”111 Second, it
emphasized that the statute “contain[ed] no jurisdictional element
establishing that the federal cause of action is in pursuance of
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.”112 The Court
specifically noted that “Congress elected to cast [the statute’s]

104. Id. at 611–12 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
105. See id. at 612.
106. Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562) (internal quotation marks omitted).
107. See id. (“The existence of [congressional] findings may ‘enable us to evaluate the
legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affect[s] interstate commerce.’”
(emphasis added) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563)); id. (“[O]ur decision in Lopez [was] rested in
part on the fact that the link between gun possession and a substantial effect on interstate
commerce was attenuated.” (emphasis added)); id. at 614 (“[T]he existence of congressional
findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause
legislation.”).
108. Id. at 613 (“Lopez makes clear that . . . a jurisdictional element would lend support to the
argument that § 13981 is sufficiently tied to interstate commerce . . . .”).
109. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) (2006).
110. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 601–02.
111. Id. at 613.
112. Id.
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remedy over a wider, and more purely intrastate, body of violent
crime.”113
Third, the Court deemed the relationship between gendermotivated violence and interstate commerce to be too attenuated to
bring the statute within Congress’s commerce authority.114 It
explained that because the “cost of crime” and “national
productivity” were so “tenuously related” to gender-motivated
crimes, recognizing such a connection to interstate commerce as
being sufficient would “permit Congress to ‘regulate not only all
violent crime, but all activities that might lead to violent crime.’”115
Finally, although Congress had made abundant findings regarding
the serious impact that gender-motivated violence has on interstate
commerce, the Court did not consider these findings sufficient to
conclude that such violence substantially affects interstate
commerce.116 Moreover, the Court emphasized that if it were to
deem Congress’s findings sufficient to establish this connection, then
“Congress might use the Commerce Clause to completely obliterate
the Constitution’s distinction between national and local
authority.”117
Although some illicit sexual conduct can be economic in
nature,118 unlike the gender-motivated violence in Morrison,
18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) regulates participation “in any illicit sexual
conduct with another person.”119 Section 2423(c) accordingly covers
all forms of nonconsensual sex and sex acts with minors, which are,
like the regulated behaviors in Lopez and Morrison, criminal, not

113. Id.
114. See id. at 615.
115. Id. at 612–13 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995)).
116. See id. at 614.
117. Id. at 615. The reluctance of five Justices to uphold the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act as an exercise of Congress’s commerce power in National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2584–93, 2608, 2642–50 (2012), which was decided after
this Comment was written, reaffirmed the jurisprudence on which Lopez is based and further
constricted the “outer limits” of the Commerce Clause. Thus, Lopez remains the standard for
adjudicating exercises of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.
118. See United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1114−15 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 193 (1824)) (referring to “species of commercial intercourse,” such
as prostitution).
119. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) (2006) (emphasis added).
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economic, conduct.120 Hence, like the statute in Morrison, § 2423(c)
regulates noneconomic activity.
Nor does § 2423(c) contain an express jurisdictional element
that might limit its reach to sexual conduct that additionally has an
explicit connection with or effect on foreign commerce. Several
circuit courts have noted that the Lopez Court “did not state or imply
that . . . all statutes with such a[] [jurisdictional] element would be
constitutional.”121 Indeed, in Rodia, the Third Circuit deemed a
federal statute’s jurisdictional element “almost useless.”122 That
statute criminalizes possession of child pornography that has not
itself traveled in interstate commerce “as long as one of the materials
from which the pornography was created . . . has so traveled.”123 The
court held that the statute’s jurisdictional element does not
“adequately perform[] the function of guaranteeing that the final
product regulated substantially affects interstate commerce” because
“all but the most self-sufficient child pornographers . . . fall within
the sweep of the statute.”124
Unlike the statute in Morrison, 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) does contain
a jurisdictional element, but it is even weaker than that in Rodia.
Section 2423(c) applies to “[a]ny United States citizen . . . who
travels in foreign commerce . . . .”125 This jurisdictional element does
very little to limit the statute’s reach to sexual conduct that is
explicitly connected with or affects interstate commerce since it
requires only that a U.S. citizen have previously traveled in foreign
commerce. Accordingly, because any illicit sexual conduct would
take place after traveling in some form of foreign commerce, this
would “mean that every act . . . that occurs downstream from that
travel is subject to regulation by the United States under its Foreign
Commerce power.”126 This would effectively convert the Commerce
120. See Clark, 435 F.3d at 1120 (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 1115 (majority
opinion)) (“[T]he underlying regulated activity is not ‘quintessentially economic.’”); Colangelo,
supra note 4, at 1032 (“If gender-motivated violence . . . is not economic activity, neither is the
non-commercial sexual abuse of a minor prohibited by Section 2423(c).”).
121. United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465, 473 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v.
Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 685 (7th Cir. 1995)).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 468.
124. Id. at 473.
125. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) (2006).
126. United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1120 (9th Cir. 2006) (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
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Clause into a “general grant of police power”127 and be contrary to
the Court’s holding in Lopez that the Commerce Clause must be
“interpreted as having judicially enforceable outer limits.”128
Therefore, § 2423(c)’s jurisdictional element does not support a
finding that the statute regulates an activity that substantially affects
foreign commerce.
Similarly, the attenuated connection between commerce and
illicit sexual activity fails to establish that § 2423(c) substantially
affects foreign commerce. Because the Court has established that a
statute affecting the “cost of crime” or “national productivity” is too
tenuously related to commerce to fall within Congress’s commerce
powers,129 the Government would have to rely on a but-for causal
connection, as it did in Morrison.130 Such an argument would assert
that but for the purchase of the means of traveling in foreign
commerce, the illicit sexual conduct would not have occurred.
Recognizing that such a connection to foreign commerce is
sufficient, however, would allow Congress to regulate any foreign
activity occurring after purchasing the means of traveling in foreign
commerce, thereby eliminating the judicially enforceable outer limits
that Lopez established.131 Therefore, like the gender-motivated
violence in Morrison, illicit sexual conduct abroad is too tenuously
connected to foreign commerce to substantially affect it.
Lastly, the congressional-findings factor fails to demonstrate
that § 2423(c) substantially affects foreign commerce. Unlike in
Morrison, Congress made no findings or determinations that
commerce is at all affected by the illicit sexual conduct that
§ 2423(c) regulates.132 Accordingly, the congressional-findings
127. Clark, 435 F.3d at 1120; Recent Case, supra note 1, at 2616 (“If the act of having
boarded an international flight once upon a time can bring all downstream activities that involve
an exchange of value within the ambit of Congress’s Foreign Commerce power, the Foreign
Commerce Clause becomes a general police power with extraterritorial reach.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
128. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995); see also id. at 580 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“In a sense any conduct in this interdependent world of ours has an ultimate
commercial origin or consequence, but we have not yet said the commerce power may reach so
far.”).
129. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612–13 (2000).
130. Id. at 615.
131. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566, 580.
132. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-525, at 1−17 (2002); Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against
the Exploitation of Children Today (PROTECT) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650.
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factor does not support a conclusion that engaging in illicit sexual
conduct abroad substantially affects foreign commerce.
None of the four Morrison factors thus supports a finding that
§ 2423(c) substantially affects foreign commerce. The statute
(1) regulates noneconomic activity, (2) fails to contain an express
jurisdictional element limiting its reach to sexual conduct that is
explicitly connected with or affects foreign commerce, (3) maintains
too tenuous a relation to foreign commerce, and (4) lacks the support
of congressional findings. Therefore, had the Third Circuit applied
Lopez’s “substantially affects commerce” prong in Pendleton, the
court would have found that Congress did not have the authority
under the Foreign Commerce Clause to enact § 2423(c).
V. CONCLUSION
Congress’s intentions in enacting § 2423(c) were laudable. As
Judge Ferguson noted in his dissent in Clark, the “[s]exual
exploitation of children by foreigners is thoroughly condemnable.”133
But as Judge Ferguson also stressed, the question before the court
was not whether Congress’s intentions were admirable but whether
Congress “properly invoked its power ‘to regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations’ in enacting § 2423(c) to address this problem.”134
Congress did not do this, and the Third Circuit erred in not reaching
this conclusion in Pendleton.
By applying the “channels of commerce” prong of Lopez, the
Third Circuit erroneously concluded that Congress had the power to
enact 18 U.S.C. § 2423 under the Foreign Commerce Clause. The
court was incorrect in determining that § 2423(c)’s jurisdictional
element is expressly connected to the channels of foreign
commerce.135 Applying the “substantially affects commerce” prong
of Lopez would have not only been the correct way of adjudicating
Pendleton, but it would have also demonstrated that Congress did not
have the authority under the Foreign Commerce Clause to enact
§ 2423(c). Accordingly, because Congress exceeded its power under

133. United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1121 (9th Cir. 2006) (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
134. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
135. United States v. Pendleton, 658 F.3d 299, 308–11 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct.
2771 (2012).
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Lopez’s interpretation of the Commerce Clause, § 2423(c) is
unconstitutional.
Deeming § 2423(c) constitutional is problematic because of the
heavy penalties the statute imposes136 and because it encroaches
upon the sovereignty of foreign nations137 and grants Congress a
plenary INTERPOL power that is inconsistent with the limitations of
the Constitution.138 Accordingly, the Supreme Court should grant
certiorari to the next case that is appealed involving a conviction
under § 2423(c) and adopt the Third Circuit’s approach of applying
Lopez in the foreign commerce context. This would end the current
split between the Ninth and Third Circuits on the question. The Court
should also reject the Third Circuit’s mistaken conclusion that
Congress had the authority to enact § 2423(c) under the “channels of
commerce prong” of Lopez. In addition, if the lower courts in that
case happen to apply Lopez independently and adjudicate the case
under Lopez’s “substantially affects commerce” prong, then the
Supreme Court should reach the merits of the case, adjudicate it
under that prong, and hold that § 2423(c) is unconstitutional.
Such action by the Supreme Court would not frustrate
Congress’s legitimate interests in preventing persons from
circumventing state laws by sexually abusing children abroad.
Congress could, for example, narrow § 2423(c) to commercial sex,139
or it could seek to impose general prohibitions against illicit sexual
conduct under its treaty powers.140 Whatever Congress would elect to
do would be up to Congress, so long as it acts within the “judicially
enforceable outer limits” of the Commerce Clause141 or otherwise in
accordance with the Constitution.

136. Those convicted of violating § 2423(c) can be imprisoned for up to 30 years, like
Pendleton was. See 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) (2006); Pendleton, 658 F.3d at 302.
137. Colangelo, supra note 4, at 1002; Recent Case, supra note 1, at 2619.
138. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (2000) (“The Constitution . . . withhold[s]
from Congress a plenary police power.”); Colangelo, supra note 4, at 1002–03, 1034; Recent
Case, supra note 11, at 2615.
139. See Colangelo, supra note 4, at 1030–32; cf. Clark, 435 F.3d at 1114 (holding that
“§ 2423(c)’s combination of requiring travel in foreign commerce, coupled with engagement in a
commercial transaction while abroad, implicates foreign commerce to a constitutionally adequate
degree”).
140. See Recent Case, supra note 1, at 2617–18.
141. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566.

